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Federal Preemption: Car-Makers' Cushion Against
Air Bag Claims?
I. BACKGROUND
Despite the fact that our federal system of government is pre-
mised on the idea that the federal government and the individual
state governments have largely separate and non-overlapping
spheres of responsibility, over the years there have been numerous
situations where the laws of the states and the laws of the federal
government have come into conflict.' The supremacy clause of the
constitution provides that in such situations, the laws of the indi-
vidual states must yield.2 This is the gravamen of the doctrine of
federal preemption. It is often not clear whether such a conflict
between state and federal law has actually occurred, and the deter-
mination of whether or not such a conflict has arisen is often a
difficult one to make. The issue of federal preemption has been at
the heart of a number of different cases in a number of different
contexts.'
1. In the landmark case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824), in which the
United States Supreme Court first addressed this problem, a steamboat operator, possessing
the right to exclusive navigation of state waters, granted by New York, obtained an injunc-
tion to prevent another operator, who was licensed under an act of Congress, from navigat-
ing between New York and New Jersey. The Supreme Court dissolved the injunction, hold-
ing that the federally granted license prevailed over the state granted license. Id.
2. The Supremacy Clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
3. See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1143-47 (8th Cir.
1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972)(state agency authority to regulate radioactive waste re-
leases); KVUE, Inc. v. Moore, 709 F.2d 922, 931-32 (5th Cir. 1983), aff'd sub nom, Texas v.
KVUE, Inc., 465 U.S. 1092 (1984) (state statute governing rates which radio and television
stations could charge political advertisers); Cosmetic Toiletry and Fragrance Ass'n, Inc. v.
Minnesota, 440 F. Supp. 1216, 1220 (D. Minn. 1977), aff'd, 575 F.2d 1256 (8th Cir.
1978)(state statute governing labeling of aerosol cans); Silkwood v. Kerr- McGee Corp., 464
U.S. 238 (1984) (common law action for damages resulting from escape of plutonium from
nuclear facility); Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); Fidelity Savings and Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141 (1982) (state law prohibition against "due-on-sale" clauses preempted by federal regula-
tions); Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, 471 U.S. 707 (1985)(local
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One area in which the issue of federal preemption of state law
has been hotly contested in the last three years involves personal
injury suits brought by injured automobile drivers and passengers
against automobile manufacturers who did not install air bags in
their cars.4 The typical case has been brought as either a negli-
gence action,5 alleging that the manufacturer had not satisfied the
duty of care,6 or as a products liability action,7 alleging that the car
was defectives due to the failure to install air bags. Preemption has
been raised as a defense by manufacturers, claiming that a federal
statute9 and federal regulations exist which govern "occupant crash
protection,"' 0 and which do not absolutely require air bags." The
argument has continued that, by complying with the federal stat-
ute and regulations, via alternative safety measures, 2 the manufac-
turers have an absolute defense to a state common law action."
ordinances governing plasmapheresis centers).
4. Wood v. General Motors Corp., No 87-1750, slip op. (1st Cir. Dec 28, 1988); Heftel
v. General Motors Corp., 1988 WL 68883 (D.D.C.); Richart v. Ford Motor Co., 681 F. Supp.
1462 (D.N.M. 1988); Staggs v. Chrysler Corp., 678 F. Supp. 270 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Wattelet v.
Toyota Motor Corp., 676 F. Supp. 1039 (D. Mont. 1987); Hughes v. Ford Motor Co., 677 F.
Supp. 76 (D. Conn. 1987); Schick v. Chrysler Corp., 675 F. Supp. 1183 (D.S.D. 1987); Wood
v. General Motors Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1987), rev'd, No 87-1750, slip op. (1st
Cir. Dec. 28, 1988); Murphy v. Nissan Motor Corp., 650 F. Supp. 922 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Baird
v. General Motors Corp., 564 F. Supp. 28 (N.D. Ohio 1986); Cox v. General Motors Corp.,
646 F. Supp. 761 (D. Md. 1986); Vanover v. Ford Motor Co., 632 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Mo.
1986); Vasquez v. Baltimore County, Not reported (D. Ariz. 1986).
5. See Richart v. Ford Motor Co., 681 F. Supp. 1462 (D.N.M. 1988); Schick v.
Chrysler Corp., 675 F. Supp. 1183 (D.S.D. 1987).
6. W. KEETON, D. DoBs, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 30, at 164 (5th Ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
7. See Hughes v. Ford Motor Co., 677 F. Supp. 76 (D. Conn. 1987); Heftel v. General
Motors Corp., 1988 WL 68883 (D.D.C.); Staggs v. Chrysler Corp., 678 F. Supp. 270 (N.D.
Ga. 1987); Wattelet v. Toyota Motor Corp., 676 F. Supp. 1039 (D. Mont. 1987); Wood v.
General Motors Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1987), rev'd, No. 87-1750, slip op. (1st
Cir. Dec. 28, 1988); Murphy v. Nissan Motor Corp., 650 F. Supp. 922 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Baird
v. General Motors Corp., 654 F. Supp. 28 (N.D. Ohio 1986); Cox v. Baltimore County, 646 F.
Supp. 761 (D. Md. 1986); Vanover v. Ford Motor Co., 632 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Mo. 1986);
Vasquez v. Baltimore County, Not reported (D. Ariz. 1986).
8. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, at § 98.
9. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1420
(1982 & Supp. 1988).
10. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1987).
11. Id. at § 571.208(S4).
12. Id.
13. See Cox v. Baltimore County, 646 F. Supp. 761, 762-63 (D. Md. 1986), wherein the
court stated:
In 1967 the Department of Transportation adopted Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard 208 requiring the installation of seat belts in automobiles. In 1970 this
Safety Standard was amended to include a set of injury criteria that had to be met by
some form of passive restraint system, including but not limited to airbags, for all
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This defense has, in all the air bag cases decided in federal district
court to date," been procedurally raised as the basis for a motion
for summary judgment. In this context, it matters little whether
the claim is framed in negligence or as strict products liability. If it
is the former, the standard at issue pertains to the conduct of the
manufacturer.' 5 If it is the latter, the standard relates to the condi-
tion of the automobile.' 6 In either case, however, the issue is
whether that standard is conclusively established by federal law.'
7
In most of the district court air bag cases the defendants' pre-
emption defenses have further been refined into two discrete, al-
ternative bases of preemption. The first of these is express pre-
emption, 8 which occurs when the pertinent statute expressly
declares that its provisions are to preempt state law.' 9 The second
mode of preemption, implied preemption, 20 is invoked where Con-
gress has not definitively spoken to the preemption issue2' in the
occupant positions of all cars manufactured after July 1974. . . . The federal regula-
tions and statutes in effect in 1975, at the time that Mr. Cox's Pinto was manufac-
tured by Ford, specifically authorized manufacturers to use three-point seat belts to
meet the then existing injury criteria. Airbags were not decreed . . . . Ford contends
that this provision, [15 U.S.C. § 1392(d)] in conjunction with Safety Standard 208
• . . constitutes an express preemption of the states' ability to impose any sort of
airbag requirement.
Id. (emphasis added).
14. See supra note 4.
15. See supra note 6.
16. See supra note 8.
17. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
18. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 376 (1978).
So long as Congress acts within an area delegated to it, the preemption of conflicting
state or local action-and the validation of congressionally authorized state or local
action-flow directly from the substantive source of the congressional action coupled
with the supremacy clause of article VI; such cases may pose complex questions of
statutory construction but raise no controversial issues of power.
Id. (footnote omitted).
19. Examples of federal statutes including an express preemption provision are 12
U.S.C. §§ 1701j-3, 1715z-17(d), 1715(z)-18(e) (Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of
1983); 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (Copyright Act of 1976); 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), c(1) (1982) (Employ-
ment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974).
20. See Scurlock v. City of Lynn Haven, 858 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir. 1988). "In addition,
preemptive intent may be inferred when Congress legislates comprehensively, thus occupy-
ing an entire field of regulation, or when state law actually conflicts with federal law and
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress." Id. at 1523.
21. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 907 (1987).
In pressing their implied preemption arguments in this appeal, each side relies exten-
sively on the legislative history of the Act. As is often the case with legislative history,
both sides have succeeded in gleaning passages that bolster their contrary positions.
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statute, but where other factors indicate that preemption was,
nonetheless, intended." These factors include considerations of
whether concurrent state law regulation would frustrate the pur-
pose of the federal legislation,23 whether there is a situation which
demands "exclusive federal regulation in order to achieve uniform-
ity vital to national interests"'" and whether simultaneous compli-
ance with both state and federal regulations is an impossibility.25
The federal statute which gives rise to the air bag preemption
defense is the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1966 (hereinafter the "Act")..2 This statute directs the Secretary of
Transportation to promulgate motor vehicle safety standards.
27
The regulation pertinent to air bags 28 is contained in the regula-
tions of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, De-
partment of Transportation.29 While this particular rule has been
amended no less than twenty-five times in the last fifteen years, 30
the provisions relating to the manufacturers' claim that they have
complied with the rule regarding air bags have effectively remained
unchanged. This regulation allows three options in order for the
manufacturer to be in compliance: 1) a complete passive protection
system, either automatic seat belts or air bags, which protect the
occupants from frontal as well as angular impact;" 2) a combina-
tion air bag and seat belt system to protect against frontal and
angular impacts respectively;3 2 or 3) a lap and shoulder belt with
warning system. The manufacturers have consistently chosen the
third option.
34
Although we find the legislative history to the Act informative, no materials have
come to our attention that we deem wholly dispositive of the issue before us. Even
more important, we find the language of the statute itself a sufficiently clear expres-
sion of congressional intent without resort the Act's legislative history.
Id. at 186.
22. See infra notes 55-89 and accompanying text.
23. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 n.20 (1941).
24. Florida Lime and Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144 (1963); see also San
Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241-244 (1959).
25. See Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 142-43.
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1420 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
27. Id. at § 1392(a).
28. Standard No. 208; Occupant crash protection, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1987).
29. 49 C.F.R. §§ 501.1-590.8 (1987).
30. See List of Sections Affected, 49 C.F.R. §§ 787-803 (1987).
31. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208(S4.1.2.1) (1987).
32. Id. at § 571.208(S4.1.2.2).
33. Id. at § 571.208(S4.1.2.3).
34. See Waters, Air Bag Litigation: Plaintiffs, Start Your Engines, 13 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 1063, 1068 n.39 (1986).
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The controversy surrounding the preemption defense can be
traced to two provisions of the Act. The first is entitled SUPREMACY
OF FEDERAL STANDARDS: ALLOWABLE HIGHER STANDARDS FOR VEHI-
CLES USED BY FEDERAL OR STATE GOVERNMENTS (hereinafter the
"Preemption Clause"),385 which states:
Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this
subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a state shall have
any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to
any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard
applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of
equipment which is not identical to the federal standard. Nothing in this
section shall be construed as preventing any state from enforcing any safety
standard which is identical to a Federal safety standard.3 6
Both the title and the language of this subsection would seem to
put to rest any controversy involving preemption, appearing to
make congressional intent to preempt state law in the area of auto-
mobile safety equipment quite clear.37 However, Congress, in what
appears to have been a deliberate attempt to confuse the issue,
also included a "savings clause '38 in the Act, entitled CONTINUA-
TION OF COMMON LAW LIABILITY, which seems equally clear that
Congress intended no such preemption of state common law. The
savings clause provides: "Compliance with any Federal motor vehi-
cle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt
any person from any liability under common law."'39 Thus, there
exists a situation where the defendants have argued that the pre-
emption clause acts to expressly preempt the common law claim,40
and plaintiffs have cited the savings clause to show that their com-
mon law claim is preserved.41 The manufacturers have argued, in
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1982 & Supp. 1988).
36. Id.
37. "The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the lan-
guage itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drugs Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975). See also
Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265 (1981).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (1982 & Supp. 1988).
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Wood v. General Motors Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1987), rev'd,
No. 87-1750, slip op. (1st Cir. Dec. 28, 1988).
General Motors argues that it complied with a federal safety standard option that
preempts state regulation on the same aspect of performance, and that a judgment of
liability in tort for failure to provide air bags would, according to General Motors,
effectively impose a non-identical safety standard in contravention of the intention of
Congress as expressed in 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d).
Id. at 1112.
41. See, e.g., Cox v. Baltimore County, 646 F. Supp. 761 (D. Md. 1986). "Plaintiffs
point to the savings clause of 15 U.S.C. Section 1397(c) as expressly preserving from pre-
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the alternative, that, even if the common law claim is not expressly
preempted, the Act and regulations impliedly preempt it.4
To date, there have been twelve federal district court cases de-
cided which involve the preemption defense to air bag claims,43
only one of which has been reviewed by a federal court of ap-
peals."" The holdings of these cases on the express and implied
preemption issues have been as inconsistent as the provisions of
the Act. 5
After having read these thirteen opinions, as well as the legisla-
tive history of the Act, 6 one can appreciate why the courts have
come to such widely varying conclusions. The statutory language is
obviously unclear on the preemption issue,47 making a determina-
tion as to express preemption very difficult. 8 The legislative his-
tory is just as misleading in its indicia of implied preemption.
Nonetheless, it is possible, through careful analysis, to arrive at
what must be the correct interpretation of congressional intent.
First of all, it must be recognized that this is not a situation
where Congress has utterly failed to consider the preemption issue,
a situation where an analysis of implied preemption would be ap-
propriate.' 9 Congressional cognizance of the issue is demonstrated
emption all common law tort suits." Id. at 764.
42. See, e.g., Richart v. Ford Motor Co., 681 F. Supp. 1462, 1463 (D.N.M. 1988);
Schick v. Chrysler Corp., 675 F. Supp. 1183, 1184 (D.S.D. 1987); Murphy v. Nissan Motor
Corp., 650 F. Supp. 922, 924 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
43. See supra note 4.
44. Wood v. General Motors Corp., No. 87-1750, slip op. (1st Cir. Dec. 28, 1988).
45. Three of the courts have held that plaintiffs' claims were not barred by either
express or implied preemption. Four of the courts found that there was express preemption.
Five of the courts found evidence of implied preemption, including three courts which had
previously held that express preemption was absent. See infra note 49 and accompanying
text.
46. S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2709; H.R. REP. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4; CONF. REP. No. 1919, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2731.
47. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
48. "The application of the preemption doctrine to a particular case is often a matter
of statutory construction and may well require a judicial determination of the legislative
intent behind a specific federal statute." Bellmore v. Mobile Oil Corp., 783 F.2d 300, 303 (2d
Cir. 1986).
49. Id.
Congressional purpose to preempt state law can be either express or implied. Absent
express preemptive language, Congressional intent to occupy a given field may be
found from either a 'scheme of federal regulation. . . so pervasive as to make reason-
able the inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it,' because
'the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant
that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the
same subject,' or because 'the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the
Vol. 27:299304
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by the two, albeit conflicting, provisions in the Act. It does not
make sense to search for indicia of implied congressional intent to
preempt, when Congress has expressly spoken on the subject. De-
spite the inherent reasonableness of this conclusion, three of the
district courts have held that the Act does not expressly preempt
the plaintiffs' air bag claims, but nevertheless have held that im-
plied preemption barred plaintiffs' state common law claims. 50 It is
puzzling that a court could conclude that Congress implied that
preemption was intended even though it had expressly said that it
was not.
For this reason, the answer regarding the question of express
preemption must lie in statutory interpretation,51 and not in an
investigation of implied preemption. This process of statutory in-
terpretation reveals that Congress did not intend to preempt a
state common law air bag claim. While eight of the twelve district
courts reached this conclusion, 2 the reasoning underlying the con-
clusion of six of these courts is defective in that each of these
courts went on to address the defendant's alternative defense of
implied preemption.5 3 In doing so, each court tacitly found that
there was an absence of express preemption in the Act. On the
other hand, careful statutory interpretation discloses that there is
an affirmative rejection of such preemption embodied in the Act.
Such "reverse preemption"54 obviates the need for and, if implied
preemption is found, refutes the results of an implied preemption
analysis.
character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.'
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
50. See Staggs v. Chrysler Corp., 678 F. Supp. 270 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Schick v. Chrysler
Corp., 675 F. Supp. 1183 (D.S.D. 1987); Baird v. General Motors Corp., 564 F. Supp. 28
(N.D. Ohio 1986).
51. See supra note 48.
52. See Richart v. Ford Motor Co., 681 F. Supp. 1462 (D.N.M. 1988); Staggs v.
Chrysler Corp., 678 F. Supp. 270 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Schick v. Chrysler Corp., 675 F. Supp.
1183 (D.S.D. 1987); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1987),
rev'd, No. 87-1750, slip op. (1st Cir. Dec. 28, 1988); Murphy v. Nissan Motor Corp., 650 F.
Supp. 922 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Baird v. General Motors Corp., 564 F. Supp. 28 (N.D. Ohio
1986).
53. Richart, 681 F. Supp. at 1467; Staggs, 678 F. Supp. at 272; Schick, 675 F. Supp. at
1185; Wood, 673 F. Supp. at 1114; Murphy, 650 F. Supp. at 927; Baird, 564 F. Supp. at 31.
54. Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1977)(reverse
preemption in McCarren-Ferguson Act); SED, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 519 F. Supp. 979, 985




Notwithstanding the fact that express preemption theory must
ultimately be found to control the disposition of common law air
bag claims, it is easy to see how a court might erroneously decide a
case based on the abundant indicia of congressional intent to im-
pliedly preempt such claims. Therefore, the following analysis of
implied preemption is undertaken with the caveat that it would
only be appropriate to consider implied preemption when the ex-
press preemptive intent of Congress cannot be gleaned,5" which is
not the case with the Motor Vehicle Safety Act.
One of the primary considerations in an implied preemption
analysis is "[w]hether, under the circumstances of a particular
case, state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress."" It is
therefore necessary to ascertain the purpose and objectives of the
Act. If the purpose of the Act is simply to provide the strictest
safety standards possible, then state common law tort liability
would clearly not be in conflict with the federal purpose. Undenia-
bly, the imposition of such liability, based on a standard deter-
mined anew with each and every jury, would put tremendous pres-
sure on the car manufacturers to put every safety device possible
on every car. This would, presumably, in turn advance the congres-
sional purpose of promoting safer cars. This reading of statutory
purpose is supported by the first section of the Act, entitled CON-
GRESSIONAL DECLARATION OF PURPOSE,5 7 which provides: "Congress
hereby declares that the purpose of this chapter is to reduce traffic
accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic
accidents." 58
The foregoing view was vigorously adopted in Richert v. Ford
Motor Company. 9 In rejecting the defendant's contention that
uniformity was a major goal of the Act, which would be frustrated
by the imposition of state tort liability, the court, citing a Second
Circuit opinion,60 said that "the reduction of traffic accidents,
rather than uniformity, was the overriding concern of Congress."'"
On the other hand, if there were one or more ancillary purposes
55. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
56. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
58. Id.
59. 681 F. Supp. 1462, 1469 (D.N.M. 1988).
60. Chrysler Corp. v Tofany, 419 F.2d 499, 510 (2d Cir. 1969).
61. Richart, 681 F. Supp. at 1469.
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motivating Congress when it passed the Act, it would appear more
reasonable to disallow concurrent state activity in the regulation of
occupant crash protection. One such goal, made obvious by the
very structure of Standard 208,2 is to provide the manufacturers
with some flexibility in achieving occupant crash protection. This
reasoning was espoused by the court in Baird v. General Motors
Corporation,63 which concluded that implied preemption was in-
tended, and is supported by the fact that the regulations provide
three alternative means of compliance. 4
Support for the notion that one of the goals of the Act is to pro-
vide the manufacturers with some leeway and some input into the
methods for reducing highway carnage is found in the language of
the Act itself. First is the definition of "Motor vehicle safety stan-
dards," which "means a minimum standard for motor vehicle per-
formance, or motor vehicle equipment performance, which is prac-
ticable, which meets the need for motor vehicle safety and which
provides objective criteria."6 5 The fact that one of the goals was to
make the standards "practicable" suggests that the manufacturers,
who are in a better position to assess practicability than is a gov-
ernmental agency, should be afforded some discretion in the
method used to achieve the desired level of safety.
The need for feasible standards is also echoed elsewhere in the
statute. For example, section 1392(a) of the Act provides that
"each federal motor safety standard shall be practicable . 6
In addition, the Secretary of Transportation is instructed to "con-
sider whether any such proposed standard is reasonable, practica-
ble and appropriate ...and consider the extent to which such
standards will contribute to carrying out the purposes of this
chapter.
' 67
The legislative history of the Act buttresses this argument. The
section of the Senate Report entitled "Purpose and Need"6 8 states:
"This legislation reflects the faith that the restrained and responsi-
ble exercise of federal authority can channel the creative energies
and vast technology of the automobile industry into a vigorous and
62. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1987).
63. 654 F. Supp. 28, 32 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
64. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1987).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1391(2) (1982 & Supp. 1988) (emphasis added).
66. Id. at § 1392(a).
67. Id. at § 1392(0(3) and (4).
68. S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2709.
1989
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competitive effort to improve the safety of vehicles." 9 This pas-
sage makes clear that a secondary purpose of the Act is to en-
courage the car-makers to become involved in the process of im-
proving automobile safety. Later in the same section, the report
proclaims that "[iut is the committee's judgment that the enact-
ment of this legislation can further industry efforts to produce mo-
tor vehicles which are, in the first instance, not unduly accident
prone. '70 It is also obvious that if flexibility is accepted as a major
purpose of the Act, 71 as the foregoing excerpts suggest that it
should, then liability imposed on the basis of state common law
does stand as an obstacle to the achievement of that objective.72
The preamble to the final rulemaking for the Occupant Crash
Protection regulations73 suggests a second ancillary purpose to be
achieved by the Act."' That goal is to promote public acceptance of
whatever safety equipment is installed in cars.75 This again indi-
cates that the manufacturers should be given some leeway in the
area of installing safety equipment, since they, with their sophisti-
cated public relations and advertising capabilities, can best ad-
vance public acceptance. The imposition of state tort liability is
seemingly inconsistent with this goal.
A final collateral goal of the Act would appear to be the promo-
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2712 (emphasis added).
71. See also Senate Report 1301 at 2713-14:
Unlike the General Services Administration's procurement standards, which are pri-
marily design specifications, both the interim standards and the new and revised
standards are expected to be performance standards, specifying the required mini-
mum safe performance of vehicles but not the manner in which the manufacturer is
to achieve the specified performance. . .Such safe performance standards are thus
not intended or likely to stifle innovation in automotive design.
Id. See also Preamble to final rulemaking on Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard; Occu-
pant Crash Protection, 49 Fed. Reg. §§ 28962, 28997, 29001 (1984).
72. However, the same section also proclaims: "The committee intends that safety
shall be the overriding consideration in the issuance of standards under this bill." Id.
73. 49 Fed. Reg. § 28962 (1984).
74. Care must be taken when attempting to infer congressional intent, as opposed to
agency intent, from the promulgation of regulations. In discussing the FDA regulations ap-
plicable to DPT vaccines, the federal district court for the District of Utah recognized that:
[We realize that pursuant to her statutory authority, an administrator may promul-
gate regulations, and may make statements on her own authority. However, the fed-
eral government does not always speak with one voice and it is the intent of Congress
that determines the scope of the preempted field. In such situations, the pronounce-
ments of Congress must control over contrary statements by administrators.
Patten v. Lederle Laboratories, 655 F. Supp. 745, 750 (D. Utah 1987).
75. 49 Fed. Reg. § 29001 (1984).
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tion of a uniform set of safety standards.76 Both the Senate Report
on the Act 77 and the House Report78 indicate that Congress had
uniformity of standards in mind when the Act was passed.79 It is
obvious that "[tihis purpose would be entirely frustrated by per-
mitting individual states to adopt tort rules which would permit
liability to be imposed upon manufacturers because of the absence
of air bags."' 0
The discussion to this point has implicitly assumed that a con-
gressional purpose to achieve a reduction in highway deaths and
injuries, 81 which would appear to allow state tort law to function
concurrently, and the potential subsidiary purposes,82 which would
be frustrated by such common law intervention, are themselves at
odds. However, this apparent clash in purposes is not necessarily
present. It is possible that Congress felt that the best way to
achieve the primary goal of improved automobile safety83 is
through the achievement of the secondary goals of flexibility for
the manufacturers,8 ' public acceptance of the safety measures
8 5
and uniformity of standards.8 6 If this were the case, then tort lia-
bility, which interferes with the accomplishment of the secondary
goals, would indirectly be interfering with the primary goal and
would be impliedly preempted.8 7 It would therefore appear that
the congressional approach to the problem of improving highway
safety demands that the statute impliedly preempt state common
law liability awards.
In addition to addressing the purpose of the Act, an additional
76. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
77. S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2709.
78. H.R. REP. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
79. "Basically, this preemption subsection is intended to result in uniformity of stan-
dards so that the public as well as the industry will be guided by one set of criteria rather
than a multiplicity of divers standards." Id. at 17. See also Senate Report 1301 at 2720,
wherein the report provides: "that motor vehicle safety standards be not only strong and
adequately enforced, but that they be uniform throughout the country." Id.
80. Cox v. Baltimore County, 646 F. Supp. 761, 764 (D. Md. 1986).
81. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 62-80 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
87. See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. 805, 813 (1987)(quoting Michi-
gan Canners and Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461,
477 (1984)), wherein the Court stated: "A law also is preempted if it interferes with the
methods by which the federal statute was designed to reach this goal." Id.
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basis for analyzing whether Congress has intended to impliedly
preempt state common law claims is to search the legislative his-
tory for clues as to the respective roles of the federal government
and the states as envisioned by Congress. The Senate Report
states that "the primary responsibility for regulating the national
automotive manufacturing industry must fall squarely upon the
Federal Government. '88 This language implies that there is room
for state regulation and that state tort law has a place in the regu-
latory scheme. However, the Report makes clear that the states'
role is to be merely "consultive." 89 The fact that the states' role is
to be limited to being consultive rejects the argument that the
states can have an active role, via the imposition of tort liability, in
the setting of those standards. Consequently, it would again appear
that implied preemption was intended.
III. EXPRESS PREEMPTION
Despite the fact that an implied preemption investigation would
undoubtedly lead one to conclude that Congress must have in-
tended that the Act and accompanying regulations preempt state
tort law relating to occupant crash protection,90 statutory interpre-
tation of the Act shows that Congress expressly rejected such pre-
emption. As stated above, the preemption clause" prohibits the
states from establishing motor vehicle safety standards pertaining
to any aspect of performance governed by federal law, which are
different than the federal standard.92 This provision would appear
to preempt a common law air bag claim. At the same time, the
savings clause9 3 states that compliance with a federal motor vehicle
safety standard does not exempt any person from common law lia-
bility,94 a reverse preemption provision. In order to reach a conclu-
sion as to congressional intent, these two seemingly contradictory
subsections must be reconciled. This can be accomplished either
through a narrow reading of the savings clause, which dictates that
the air bag claims must be preempted, or through a narrow reading
88. S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2709, 2712.
89. Id. at 2715. "The committee is mindful of the contribution which the States have
made toward the development of vehicle safety standards over the years and expects this
contribution to continue in a consultive role." Id.
90. See supra notes 55-89 and accompanying text.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1982 & Supp. 1988).
92. Id.




of the preemption clause, which mandates the opposite result. For
the reasons discussed below, the second construction must be the
correct one.
A narrow reading of the savings clause was explicitly adopted by
only one of the twelve district courts. 5 What is intended by the
term "narrow reading" is "that compliance with the federal stan-
dards does not protect an automobile manufacturer from liability
for design or manufacturing defects in connection with matters not
covered by the federal standards." '  This interpretation is es-
poused and more fully explained in a recent law review article.
9 7
The author, Professor Wilton, explains that there are two types of
federal preemption. The first, which he calls "type 1," occurs when
Congress "occupies the field" so that the states are prevented from
regulating in that area at all." The second, termed "type 2" pre-
emption, occurs when Congress has not "occupied the field,"
choosing to regulate only certain aspects of the subject matter, but
where a purported99 state regulation directly conflicts with the lim-
ited federal regulation. 00 He then posits that the savings clause
preserves "type 2" preemption but defeats "type 1" preemption. 0 1
All of this really boils down to a narrow reading of the scope of the
savings clause.
Dubbing the foregoing construction a "conflict analysis,"'0 2 Pro-
fessor Wilton illustrates its application with an example involving
federal regulation of headlight brightness. 03 He explains that a
state common law claim that a car's headlights were not bright
enough would be preempted because the savings clause, as nar-
rowly construed, would not act to preserve that common law
claim.104 On the other hand, a common law claim that the tail
lights were not bright enough would not be preempted because this
claim would be based on an aspect of performance not directly ad-
dressed by the federal regulations. Therefore, such a claim would
95. See Cox v. Baltimore County, 646 F. Supp. 761 (D. Md. 1986).
96. Id. at 764 (emphasis added).
97. See Wilton, Federalism Issues in "No Airbag" Tort Claims: Preemption and Re-
ciprocal Comity, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1985) [hereinafter Wilton].
98. Id. at 12.
99. "Purported" because the ultimate validity of the regulation is the question in
issue.
100. Wilton, supra note 97, at 12-13.






be preserved by the savings clause.'05
The foregoing argument is based on the reasoning that to read
the savings clause more broadly would "result in its frustrating,
indeed defeating, the purpose of the Safety Act of establishing uni-
form standards. '" 106 While this rationale does make some sense, in
as much as uniformity does appear to be at least a secondary pur-
pose of the Act, 107 it has one fatal flaw: the words of the savings
clause do not say what Professor Wilton claims they say.108 The
savings clause says that "compliance with any Federal ...stan-
dard .. .does not exempt any person from any liability under
common law."' 0 9 It does not say that compliance with a federal
standard does not exempt any person from common law liability
arising from a federally non-regulated aspect of performance. Pro-
fessor Wilton even acknowledges that the plain language of the
savings clause does not support his analysis. "If the savings clause
were read in literal and simplistic fashion to relieve state common
law from normal rules of preemption, the state common law could
frustrate the purposes of the federal regulatory scheme and effec-
tively nullify the federal law."" 0 It is doubtful that his elaborate,
policy-driven interpretation is preferable to a "literal and simplis-
tic""' reading.
Professor Wilton alludes to the following comment in the Senate
Report on the Act"' to buttress his interpretation: "[c]ompliance
with . . . [federal safety] standards would thus not necessarily
shield any person from product liability at common law."" 3 He in-
terprets this to mean that compliance with federal standards only
shields a defendant if the state common law claim arose from an
aspect of performance directly addressed by the federal regula-
tions, and not otherwise." 4 His argument is that if the savings
clause was an absolute savings clause, the word "necessarily"
would have been omitted."15 However, there is another, more per-
105. Id.
106. Cox, 646 F. Supp. at 764.
107. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 39.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (1982 & Supp. 1988) (emphasis added).
110. Wilton, supra note 97, at 21-22.
111. Id. at 22.
112. S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWs 2709.
113. Wilton, supra note 97, at 24 (quoting S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4,
reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2709, 2720).




suasive explanation for the limitation expressed by the "not neces-
sarily" language. This interpretation requires reading that sentence
in the context of the entire section of the Senate Report, entitled
"Effect on State Law," in which it is contained."'
The centralized, mass production, high volume character of the motor vehi-
cle manufacturing industry in the United States requires that motor vehicle
safety standards not only be strong and adequately enforced, but that they
be uniform throughout the country. At the same time, the committee be-
lieves that the States should be free to adopt standards identical to the
Federal standards. . .so that the States may play a significant role in the
safety field by applying and enforcing standards over the life of the car.
Accordingly, State standards are preempted only if they differ from Fed-
eral standards applicable to the particular aspect of the vehicle or item of
vehicle equipment (sec. 104).
The States are also permitted to set more stringent requirements for pur-
poses of their own procurement. Moreover, the federal minimum safety
standards need not be interpreted as restricting State common law stan-
dards of care. Compliance with such standards would not necessarily shield
any person from product liability at common law."
7
The repeated references in this section to identical state and
federal standards provides the clue to interpreting the "not neces-
sarily" language. This sentence is better read to mean that compli-
ance with a federal standard only shields a defendant from com-
mon law liability if the federal standard is identical to the state
standard, and not otherwise. Indeed, the quoted passage says ex-
actly this.118 This is a logical interpretation since compliance with
a federal standard would necessarily result in compliance with an
identical state standard, and therefore constitute an absolute de-
fense to a tort claim. Consequently, it would seem that a construc-
tion of the "not necessarily" language based on the identical na-
ture of the state and federal standards is more persuasive than a
construction based on a "conflict analysis.""19 Moreover, because a
"plain meaning" construction of the savings clause does not sup-
port a narrow reading of that provision,'2 0 and because the only
non-policy basis for that reading to be found in the legislative his-
tory is inadequate to overcome a literal reading,' 21 this clause can-
116. S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2709, 2720.
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. "State standards are preempted only if they differ from Federal standards appli-
cable to the particular aspect of the vehicle or item of vehicle equipment" Id.
119. See supra notes 97-115 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
1989
Duquesne Law Review
not realistically be interpreted to apply only to state common law
liability arising from an alleged defect not directly covered by the
federal regulations.
The other option for harmonizing the two provisions of the Act
is to read the preemption clause narrowly. Such a reading would
exclude state common law damage awards from the purview of the
term "safety standard" as used in that clause.'22 This construction
was adopted by five of the district courts,12 and seems to have
been the main battleground in most of the cases. While there are
very strong reasons for generally rejecting an interpretation that
the imposition of common law liability does not constitute the set-
ting of "standards," it is, nonetheless, impossible in the case of this
particular statute to conclude that Congress intended anything
else.
The rationale adopted by the court in Richart v. Ford Motor
Company124 epitomizes the argument that imposition of common
law liability does not amount to regulation or the setting of stan-
dards. The court repeatedly asserted that it did "not accept the
premise that a state damage award 'compels' a manufacturer to
install passive restraints .. ."125 The argument goes that:
[N]on-compliance with the federal safety standards constitutes a violation
subject to civil penalties and injunctive relief. . . .An award of tort damages
does not invoke this panoply of sanctions and prohibitions; rather, such an
award is aimed at compensating a victim for tortious conduct. The manu-
facturer need not alter its future conduct but may instead choose to com-
pensate the victim.126
The foregoing reasoning adopted by the Richart court is faulty
for a number of reasons. First, it ignores the fact that a damage
award is typically many times greater than a fine and that, to the
extent that regulatory impact is proportional to the amount of
money involved, the damage award clearly regulates the manufac-
turer's conduct.12 Secondly, with respect to the Richart court's
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1982 & Supp. 1988).
123. See Richart v. Ford Motor Co., 681 F. Supp. 1462 (D.N.M. 1988); Schick v.
Chrysler Corp., 675 F. Supp. 1183 (D.S.D. 1987); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 673 F.
Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1987), rev'd, No. 87-1750, slip op. (1st Cir. Dec. 28, 1988); Murphy v.
Nissan Motor Corp., 650 F. Supp 922 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Baird v. General Motors Corp., 654
F. Supp. 28 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
124. 681 F. Supp. 1462 (D.N.M. 1988).
125. Id. at 1468.
126. Id. at 1469 (citing Wood v. General Motors Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1108, 1113 (D.
Mass. 1987)).
127. "The underpinning of this argument is that a return of a large monetary award in
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reasoning:
The same could be said, however, for traditional [written] state regulations
which conflict with federal regulations. The manufacturer could always fol-
low the federal standard and pay the fine for violating the state one. The
preemption question is properly whether the manufacturer can comply with
both state and federal standards, not whether he can comply with one and
pay the price for resulting non-compliance with the other.'
Finally, the Richart approach presumes that the manufacturer
has the option of complying with both the state standard and the
federal standard. Imagine, however, the following scenario. As a re-
sult of several state tort damage awards on air bag claims in New
Mexico, a manufacturer switches to a complete air bag system in
its cars. Subsequently, a passenger in one of these cars, who is not
wearing his lap belt, is injured in a collision in Massachusetts, de-
spite the proper deployment of the air bag.1 9 The injured party
now sues for damages, claiming that, by failing to install a 3-point
belt system, the manufacturer had not complied with Massachu-
setts common law standards. The manufacturer is thus placed in a
position where, by complying with the standards of one state, he is
liable for non-compliance with the standards of another state. The
manufacturer does not have the option of complying with "state
law" because "state law" involves a potential multiplicity of
standards.' a3
a situation where a manufacturer failed to install airbags would, in a very realistic sense,
force all manufacturers to install air bags to avoid potential liability." Staggs v. Chrysler
Corp., 678 F. Supp. 270, 271 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
128. Wilton, supra note 97, at 19.
129. Such an occurrence is not merely fanciful. In the preamble to the promulgation of
an amendment to 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 the Department of Transportation stated: "Airbags
are not designed to provide protection at barrier equivalent impact speeds less than approx-
imately 12 mph. In addition, to provide protection comparable to that of a 3-point belt, they
must be used in conjunction with a lap belt." 49 Fed. Reg. § 29001 (1984).
130. In Hughes v. Ford Motor Co., 677 F. Supp. 76 (D. Conn. 1987), the court rea-
soned that:
The manufacturer would, if plaintiffs were correct, be faced with a Hobson's choice.
If, as here, the choice was for the ignition interlock, [an alternative to air bags under
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, see note 12 supra.] the claim would be
that the lack of an airbag was a defect. If the choice was an airbag, the lack of igni-
tion interlock would be claimed to be a defect. There is an even greater quandary.
Having made the choice and faced with the claim of a defect in the absence of which-
ever device was not selected, here the airbag, the vagaries of jury standards of safety
could result in a different result in each suit brought. The law, as argued by plaintiffs,
would thus leave to a manufacturer no choice, contrary to Congress' policy. Manufac-
turers would be obligated to install both devices at the expense of the consumer with
no suggestion that dual installations produce any greater safety.
Id. at 77-78 (footnote omitted).
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There is a line of cases in federal court which specifically hold
that the imposition of common law liability can be a powerful reg-
ulatory tool."'1 The leading case in this area, San Diego Building
Trades Council v. Garmon,32 was cited by four of the air bag
courts.13 3 The United States Supreme Court in Garmon held that:
The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a po-
tent method of governing conduct and controlling policy. Even the States'
salutary efforts to redress private wrongs or grant compensation for past
harm cannot be exerted to regulate activities that are potentially subject to
the exclusive federal regulatory scheme."
While, as a general rule, the Garmon approach is undoubtedly
correct, and the view taken by the Richart court is unrealistic, in
the case of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act'35 the opposite conclusion
is mandated. For reasons to which none of the courts who narrowly
construed the preemption clause alluded, it appears that Congress
did not intend to include common law liability in its conception of
"setting of standards." ' This conclusion in turn allows the pre-
emption clause and the savings clause to be reconciled.
Such an interpretation is based on the recognition that other
provisions of the Act are in pari materia 37 with the preemption
clause and give some insight into the meaning of the term "stan-
dard" as used therein. The Act is replete with examples of the use
of the word "standard" which indicate that Congress, when using
that term, contemplated a written, legislatively, or administratively
established norm. The Act states that "[t]he Secretary may by or-
der amend or revoke any Federal motor vehicle safety stan-
dard. . .";"8 that "[t]he Secretary shall issue initial Federal motor
vehicle safety standards. . .,";' that "the Secretary shall publish
proposed Federal motor vehicle safety standards ... ,;140 and that
131. See Belknap v. Hale, 462 U.S. 491 (1983); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d
620 (1st Cir. 1987); Mobile Mechanical Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Carlough, 664 F.2d 481
(5th Cir. 1981).
132. 359 U.S. 236 (1959)
133. See Schick v. Chrysler Corp., 675 F. Supp. 1183 (D.S.D. 1987); Staggs v. Chrysler
Corp., 678 F. Supp. 270 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Baird v. General Motors Corp., 564 F. Supp. 28
(N.D. Ohio 1986); Cox v. General Motors Corp., 646 F. Supp. 761 (D. Md. 1986).
134. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 247.
135. See supra note 9.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1982 & Supp. 1988).
137. "Of the same matter; on the same subject; as, laws pari materia must be con-
strued with reference to each other." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1004 (5th Ed. 1979).
138. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(e) (1982 & Supp. 1988) (emphasis added).
139. Id. at § 1392(h) (emphasis added).
140. Id. at § 1392(i)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
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"the Secretary shall promulgate Federal motor vehicle safety
standards ... "1
The legislative history offers further examples which support
this construction. For example, the legislative history alludes to
the "standards produced by the committees of the Society of Au-
tomotive Engineers" 42 and "interim standards, which will be
promulgated ... ," It also provides that "[t]he Secretary is di-
rected to issue new and revised standards. ' 144 In a section of the
Senate Report on the Act entitled "Procedures on the Promulga-
tion of Safety Standards, 1 4 5 the Senate committee further states:
"The Secretary is directed to consult with . . . such other state
and interstate agencies, including legislative committees . . . to
encourage them to adopt standards which are identical to the fed-
eral ones (sec. 104).1'' 1, Clearly, the Senate committee envisioned
"standards" as emanating from legislative or administrative bodies
rather than from the courts.
A final point to lend support to this construction can be found in
the section of the Senate Report entitled "Effect on State Law,' 4
which recites that "the Federal minimum safety standards need
not be interpreted as restricting State common law standards of
care." 48 The phrase "State common law standards of care" should
be read as a single term, in contradistinction to the term "stan-
dard" which appears six prior times in that section. 49 Thus, the
term "standard," as used in the preemption clause, would be exclu-
sive of "State common law standards of care." This interpretation
allows the savings clause to preserve all state common law air bag
claims, with the narrow exception of those where the manufacturer
complied with identical federal and written state standards. As
such, it is a "reverse preemption" provision with respect to state
common law. As stated above, this conclusion renders moot an im-
plied preemption analysis.
141. Id. at § 1392(i)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
142. S. REP. No. 1301, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2711 (em-
phasis added).
143. Id. at 2713 (emphasis added).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2715-16.
146. Id. at 2715 (emphasis added).





IV. WOOD V. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
To date, only one of the twelve air bag cases decided in a United
States District Court has been reviewed on appeal, that being
Wood v. General Motors Corporation.'" This was a products lia-
bility action in which the trial court, 51 after finding no express
preemption in the Act,1 52 went on to look for indicia of implied
preemption, only to find such indicia absent.1 53 Consequently, the
defendant manufacturer's motion for summary judgment was
denied.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit conducted a thorough analysis of the Act and concluded that
while express preemption was absent,' 54 implied preemption
should be a bar to the plaintiff's common law claim. ' It therefore
remanded the case to the district court for a disposition consistent
with its opinion.'16
The analysis conducted by the court of appeals is superior to all
of the district court analyses inasmuch as it embodies a genuine
attempt to understand Congress' motivation in enacting the Motor
Vehicle Safety Act, in light of the conditions prevailing in 1966.
The court held that the type of lawsuit involved in this case, a tort
action alleging defective design, was not known in the days preced-
ing the passage of the Act.1 5 7 The court opined that because such a
cause of action was unknown, Congress was not envisioning this
type of suit when it composed either the "preemption clause' 16 8 or
the "savings clause. ' 159 Because the preemption clause was not
drafted with this type of action in mind, the court held that it did
not apply to a negligent design suit, and consequently, that express
preemption of this type of action could not possibly have been
intended.' 6°
Similarly, the court rejected the plaintiff's contention, as
adopted by the trial court, that the "savings clause" preserved the
150. No. 87-1750, slip op. (1st Cir. Dec. 28, 1988) [hereinafter No. 87-1750].
151. Wood v. General Motors Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1987).
152. Id. at 1113-14.
153. Id. at 1114-18.
154. Wood v. General Motors Corp., No. 87-1750 at 33.
155. Id. at 48.
156. Id. at 68.
157. Id. at 18, 24-30.
158. Id. at 19.
159. Id.
160. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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common law action. 61 Again, the rationale was that if Congress
was not cognizant of that cause of action, it could not have written
the "savings clause" to preserve it.
162
The court buttressed its argument that Congress did not antici-
pate the problem presented by this suit by suggesting that even if
Congress had been able to foresee defective design lawsuits, it
could not have envisioned a situation where such a suit would have
an effect which potentially overlapped the standard-setting func-
tion embodied in the Act. 63 This is because defective design suits
would, in most cases, have the effect of imposing design standards,




After concluding that neither the "preemption clause" nor the
"savings clause" applied to the action at hand, the court noted
that the Act does not contain an explicit statement as to preemp-
tion, either pro or con, and that an implied preemption analysis
was therefore appropriate. 65 Having thus arrived at an implied
preemption analysis, it was easy for the court to conclude that im-
plied preemption prevailed.' 66 The primary basis for this result is
that suits such as the plaintiff's would frustrate the goal of uni-
formity of standards embodied in the Act and regulations.
6 7
The Achilles' heel of the court's analysis is the conclusion that a
cause of action for negligent design was unavailable to plaintiffs at
the time that Congress was considering the Act,16 8 and that neither
the "preemption clause" nor the "savings clause" applied to that
cause of action.6 9 When considering the court's assertion that
Congress "did not envisage this peculiar type of lawsuit, "170 one
inevitably wonders what type of lawsuit Congress was contemplat-
ing when it wrote: "Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle
safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any
161. No. 87-1750 at 19.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 29-30.
164. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
165. No. 87-1750 at 33. See also note 49 supra and accompanying text. This justifica-
tion of an implied preemption analysis is not subject to the criticism leveled above that an
implied preemption analysis is inappropriate because "reverse preemption" is explicitly
stated. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
166. No. 87-1750 at 33-51. See also notes 55-89 supra and accompanying text.
167. No. 87-1750 at 47-48. See also notes 76-80 supra and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
170. No. 87-1750 at 23.
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person from liability under common law." ' The same question
comes to mind with respect to several excerpts from the legislative
history cited by the court to support its contention, 17 2 including
"common law standards of care,' 73 "rights of parties under com-
mon law particularly those relating to warranty, contract and tort
liability,' 7 4 "common law remedy,"' 75 and "common law on prod-
uct liability.'
76
In answer to this question, the court offers only the following
response: "Instead Congress had in mind the then customary
'State common law standards of care' pertaining to the negligent
operation or manufacture of vehicles, coupled, no doubt, with war-
ranty claims then customary, none of which had the potential to
create the current problem.'
1 77
Addressing each of these causes of action seriatim, in light of the
language of the "savings clause," it appears that none of them are
a plausible and exclusive alternative to a negligent design suit as
the object of congressional attention. First, to suggest that in the
"savings clause" Congress meant that compliance with a federal
safety standard would not exempt a person from liability for negli-
gent operation of the vehicle, belies the weakness of the court's
argument. Compliance with a safety standard relates to actions of
the maker of the car, while negligent operation bears upon behav-
ior of the driver.
Second, the court would have us believe that Congress meant
that compliance with a federal safety standard would not exempt a
person from liability for negligent manufacture of the vehicle. At
least with this suggestion, the party responsible for "compliance"
is the same party who is potentially "exempt . . . from liability
under common law." However, the "savings clause" could then
only have meaning in situations where a manufacturing defect was
such as to give rise to potential common law liability, while at the
same time rendering the vehicle in compliance with the federal
safety standard. This would appear to be such a rare situation that
it is impossible to believe that it was the motivation for the "sav-
171. 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (1982 & Supp. 1988).
172. No. 87-1750 at 30-31.
173. S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. AD-
MIN. NEWS 2709, 2720.
174. H.R. REP. No. 1776, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 24.
175. 112 Cong. Rec. 19, 663 (1966) (remarks of Representative Dingell).
176. Id. at 14, 230 (remarks of Senator Magnuson).




Finally, it is proposed by the court that Congress really had a
warranty action in mind when it drafted the "savings clause."
While this is certainly possible, it too has serious problems. By
1966, forty-eight of the states had adopted the Uniform Commer-
cial Code.1 8 As a result, by that time, warranty actions pertinent
to automobiles were statutory and no longer based on common law;
the words of the savings clause, however, make explicit reference
to the "common law." Even assuming that the vestiges of common
law warranty were on the minds of members of Congress in 1966,
the court's claim that a warranty action did not have "the poten-
tial to create the current problem" 17 9 is not convincing. "The cur-
rent problem" refers to a lawsuit which "itself created an overlap-
ping design standard so similar to FMVSS [Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard] as to raise the question of the former's preemp-
tion by the latter."180
Contrary to the court's assertion, a warranty action under the
Uniform Commercial Code has precisely this potential. The code
imposes an implied warranty of merchantability on goods sold by
merchants. 81 This provision requires that for "[g]oods to be mer-
chantable [they] must be such as ... (c) are fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used.. ."I" The determination
of whether a car is "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such
goods are used" is exactly the kind of setting of design standards
which can overlap with the federal standards.
In any event, the court appears not to have relied very heavily
on warranty actions as an alternative to defective design suits as
being in the forefront of congressional consciousness in 1966, since
it listed them as a kind of "throw in," along with the primary al-
ternatives of negligent operation and negligent manufacture.18 3
Therefore, even though the court appears to make a strong case for
the rarity of design defect cases before 1966,18 the majority con-
cedes that "[w]e do not mean to suggest that broadened design
liability, as reflected by Larsen v. General Motors Corp., was en-
178. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 4, 5 (3rd Ed. 1988).
179. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
180. No. 87-1750 at 32.
181. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1987).
182. Id.
183. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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tirely unforeseeable.' ' 185 Because the alternatives advanced are so
unpersuasive, it would appear that, contrary to the court's conclu-
sion, a negligent design action was part of congressional thinking
in 1966.
As to the related argument that Congress never expected design
standards potentially arising from common law suits to overlap
with the federal performance standards, 86 the court itself recog-
nized that "although design and performance standards are analyt-
ically distinct, in practice the line is not so clear."' 87 If one rejects
the conclusion that the Act in no way addressed actions alleging
defective design, the court was no longer justified in even perform-
ing an implied preemption analysis, and the result previously sug-
gested 88 obtains.
V. CONCLUSION
It is not uncommon for Congress to enact legislation in which its
intent vis-a-vis the preemption issue is not clear. 189 It is, however,
difficult to imagine a case where Congress could have affirmatively
obfuscated the issue to a greater extent than it did with the Motor
Vehicle Safety Act. This discussion has used twelve cases decided
in United States District Courts and one United States Court of
Appeals opinion as a backdrop. Assuming the validity of the con-
clusion reached herein, that being that common law air bag claims
are not preempted by the Act, nine of those district courts, along
with the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, reached the incor-
rect result that the plaintiffs' common law claims were barred by
federal preemption. This is a frighteningly high percentage of in-
correct results. Even the three courts which reached the proper
resolution failed to appreciate that the Act contains a reverse pre-
emption provision which should have obviated the need for the im-
plied preemption analysis undertaken by each.
While it is certainly incumbent on any court to perform a thor-
ough analysis of the preemption issue in whatever context it arises,
it is equally incumbent on Congress to make its intention on that
subject as clear as possible. In this case, where Congress has cam-
ouflaged its intent to the point that three fourths of the United
185. No. 87-1750 at 26.
186. See supra notes 163, 164 and accompanying text.
187. No. 87-1750 at 60.
188. See supra notes 135-149 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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States District Courts and the only United States Court of Appeals
addressing the issue could not uncover it, Congress clearly has
failed.
Rudy Fabian

